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Abstract 
This paper is an extended version of the talks “Uncertainty and Robust Solutions: 
Lessons from IIASA Case Studies on Catastrophic Risk Management and Economic 
Growth under Shocks” given on 12 June 2002 and “Sink Technologies and Climate 
Risk Management” given on 15 May 2002 at IIASA’s Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
seminars (see web site: www.iiasa.ac.at/~marek/ggi/). 
Risks of disaster arise out of the combination of natural hazards and human activities. 
We argue that by divorcing the natural disaster issues from social and economic 
development, half of this disaster equation is ignored. The current pace of disaster 
development is undermining the markets and safety nets not only of developing 
countries. Far greater policy coherence is needed between economists, development 
planners, natural scientists and disaster managers in order to prevent catastrophic losses 
to human lives, livelihoods, and natural and economic assets.  
In this paper we present an integrated approach to catastrophic risk management that 
aims at more coherence and comprehensiveness. The models presented take into 
account spatial and temporal heterogeneity of catastrophes as well as institutional 
heterogeneity within a model of economic growth. Loss and gains profiles are functions 
of various strategies/requirements/goals of agents such as individuals, governments, 
producers, insurers and investors. GIS-based catastrophe models and stochastic 
optimization methods allow to guide policy analyses with respect to location specific 
risk exposures.  
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Abrupt Climate Change: Lessons from 
Integrated Catastrophic Risk Management 
Tatiana Ermolieva and Michael Obersteiner 
1 Background on Climate Risk Management 
Much of the debate on climate change is based on a scientific understanding that the 
climate will change gradually and incrementally. In fact, until a few decades ago it was 
generally thought that all large-scale global and regional climate changes occurred 
gradually over a timescale of many centuries or millennia, scarcely perceptible during a 
human lifetime. Almost all prominent economic assessment models today are 
deterministic and fail to account for the uncertainties in climate change and do not take 
into account the inherently abrupt nature of the climate leading to extreme climate 
events.1 This might also be the reason why there are only very loose ties between the 
climate change and the risk and natural disaster communities.  
The ill-tempered nature of the “beast” climate, exhibiting relatively sudden changes, has 
been one of the most surprising outcomes of the most recent study of the earth’s history 
(Taylor et al., 1993). The economic profession and policy makers have so far ignored 
this scientific fact. Today, numerous studies on paleo-climatic proxies give evidence 
that climate change has been abrupt and disruptive to ecological systems and societies 
on large or even global scales (NRC, 2002). The time span of the past few million years 
has been punctuated by many rapid climate transitions, most of them on time scales of 
centuries to decades or even less. Detailed analysis of terrestrial and marine records of 
climate change will, however, be necessary before we can confidently say on what 
timescale these events occurred; they almost certainly did not take longer than a few 
centuries (Adams et al., 1999). Another under-researched issue is the geographic extent 
and distribution of punctuated climate events. 
Various mechanisms, involving orbital forcing, volcanic activity, changes in ocean 
circulation, changes in atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases or haze 
particles, and changes in snow and ice cover have been invoked to explain these sudden 
regional and global transitions ― some of which are outside human influence and as 
such can not be managed. It is still unclear how the climate, on a regional or even global 
scale, can change as rapidly as present evidence suggests. It appears that the climate 
                                                 
1
 Well-known models in the literature include the DICE model (Nordhaus, 1993) and the global 2100 
model (Manne and Richels, 1992). For a survey see, e.g., the Energy Journal (1999). Notable and very 
recent examples are Mastrandrea and Schneider (2001) and Heal and Kriström (2002) both of which 
present rather stylized models and fail to model climate risk by appropriate stochastic processes. 
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system exhibits chaotic properties and is more delicately balanced than previously 
thought, linked by a cascade of powerful mechanisms that can amplify a small, maybe 
untraceable and unknown, initial change into much larger shifts in climate parameters. It 
is precisely the abruptly changing nature of the climate that requires new paradigms to 
approach the problem of climate change in the long run. Most of the traditional 
economic approaches are inappropriate in situations of such extreme uncertainty and 
risk. Surprises are inevitable, however, and the magnitude and frequency of sudden 
changes are affected and, to a certain extent, managed by human influence. This is the 
core of our interest in this paper and we will review the most recent advances in 
catastrophic risk modeling and management in order to investigate the possible transfer 
of this knowledge and tools for managing abrupt climate systems change.  
As researchers, it is not only uncertainty about the underlying climate science that 
should concern us. Ultimately, we are interested in the impact of climate change on 
human societies, which involves knowing not only about how the climate may alter but 
also about how changes in the climate regime translate into impacts that matter to 
humans in a direct or even an indirect way. How do climate changes translate into 
changes in agricultural production (food security),2 into changes in the ranges of disease 
vectors, into changes in patterns of tourist travel, or even into feelings of well-being 
directly associated with the state of the climate? Even if we knew exactly what the 
climate would be in 2100, we would still face major economic uncertainties because we 
do not currently know how altered climate states map into human welfare.  
In summary, there are at least three different kinds of uncertainty that should be taken 
into account, namely, scientific, impact and policy uncertainties. The instruments of 
possible policy responses to climate change take two forms (for an overview, see 
Obersteiner et al., 2001): mitigation, i.e., actions that reduce the flow of greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere and, thereby, change the probability distribution over future 
climate states; and adaptation,3 actions that reduce and redistribute the damages 
associated with a given climate state within a society. Both forms provide sources of 
uncertainty with respect to their implementation and their effectiveness when 
implemented. In the domain of mitigation, perhaps the most prominent sources of 
uncertainties are institutional and technological. Will the international community adopt 
aggressive mandates to restrict emissions of greenhouse gases? Will mitigation 
measures be effective in the sense that they reduce climate hazard? Will the institutions 
that implement these mandates be efficient, i.e., will the marginal cost of net reductions 
in emissions be roughly equal across all sources and sinks? What technical changes will 
appear to reduce the costs of mitigation? Likewise, adaptation involves uncertainty 
about the different options that will become available, and their costs.  As a particular 
                                                 
2
 A newly released IIASA report (see Fischer et al., 2002) integrates spatial agro-ecological evaluations 
of all countries, developed and developing, into a world economy and trade policy general equilibrium 
model. While elevated greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere and associated global warming 
will result in improved agricultural potential for some (mainly developed) countries, a large number of 
poor and food-insecure developing countries may lose a significant proportion of their agro-ecological 
production potential. 
3
 Note that the risk community uses the term ‘mitigation’ for both mitigation and most adaptation 
measures defined by the climate community. 
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adaptation strategy, the role of the financial industry and its climate change related 
instruments is crucial in this respect. 
With respect to uncertainty the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) goes further and recognizes no less 
than five stages of uncertainty, which is the result of breaking down the scientific 
uncertainty into sub-categories (IPCC TAR, 2001). These five categories are uncertainty 
about emission scenarios (i.e., about anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases4), 
about the responses of the carbon cycle to these emissions, about the sensitivity of the 
climate to changes in the carbon cycle, about the regional implications of a global 
climate scenario, and finally uncertainty about the possible impacts on human societies. 
The TAR has a diagram showing the degree of uncertainty rising as we move through 
these five stages, with the error bars growing from stage to stage. 
Uncertainty is pervasive in the analysis of climate change. Uncertainty can of course be 
reduced through learning. This consideration leads to a second-order, or meta-form of 
uncertainty ― what new information will be revealed to resolve present uncertainties? 
To what extent can and will research accelerate the pace of learning? Given future 
learning possibilities, the issues of irreversibility and quasi-option value may become 
salient. This discussion clearly suggests that any economic analysis of climate change 
should include uncertainty as a central feature. Yet current assessment literature shows 
that the bulk of the work to date has been deterministic, though there are exceptions and 
the trend is changing.  
If uncertainty is central then attitudes towards risk and the degree of risk aversion will 
presumably be central parameters. Institutions for risk-shifting will also be important (in 
particular with respect to the “news” of abrupt climate change), as will the possibility 
that some changes are irreversible, which will most likely be the case with abrupt 
climate change, and that we may learn more about them with the passage of time 
suggests that real option values may also matter in the analysis of policy measures. In 
this respect, the notion of currently existing models using truncated forms of uncertainty 
that is, in fact, treated as certainty needs to be renounced in order to guarantee the 
robustness of policies and institutions. Another analytically interesting feature of 
climate change is that the risks are not exogenous, as in many models of uncertainty in 
economics, but are generated by our own activities. This endogeneity of risks raises 
questions about the use of markets and insurance for hedging some of the risks 
associated with possible climate change ― there is the macro-level equivalent of moral 
hazard here. Finally, as many authors have remarked, the time horizon that is implicit in 
climate change is very long indeed and, measured in centuries, it is far longer than 
economists are used to. Uncertainties are almost inevitably large when decisions involve 
such long time horizons, despite the fact that abrupt climate change can take place over 
time spans of years or decades. In summary, therefore, in analyzing climate change 
policies, our attitudes towards risk will be important as perhaps will the values of 
maintaining certain options open. Our research will be able to provide the analysis of 
the impact of risk averseness versus risk prone strategic postures with respect to climate 
change. 
                                                 
4
 IIASA provided pioneering work in this respect, see Gritsevskii and Nakicenovic (2000).  
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Endogeneity of risks may pose some problems for the use of certain types of financial 
institutions, and the length of the time horizon will pose a challenge to our normal ideas 
about discounting. A very general model that incorporates most of the central issues is 
still lacking. Certainly, a model that takes abrupt climate change seriously and accounts 
for endogeneity of risk is too complex to be solved analytically as rare and dependent 
events have to be incorporated in the model structure. IIASA has a long tradition in 
solving these kinds of “insurmountable” analytical problems.  
In this paper, we will look at a range of issues relating to the management of climate 
risks by economic institutions such as financial markets in combination with climate 
mitigation and adaptation measures, the impact of uncertainty and the endogeneity of 
risks, and we will describe the methodological approach and pathway to solve this 
problem. Furthermore, we will stress the importance of geographic and temporal 
clustering of hazards and their implication for robustness of risk management. 
2 Background on Natural Disaster Risk Management 
The possibility of more frequent extreme natural disasters dominates the discussions of 
current global changes. Climate models used by the IPCC for projecting climate change 
predict various negative effects due to increased anthropogenic CO2 emissions. One of 
the main negative inferences is the possibility of increased frequency, severity, and 
duration of such extreme natural hazards as inter alia more hot days, heat waves, 
precipitation events, tornados and thunderstorms. While fluctuations in temperature 
changes are well established (see, e.g., IPCC TAR, 2001) changes in precipitation 
regimes are not as well researched. A rather recent study by Milly et al. (2002) found 
that the frequency of severe floods in large river basins has increased during the 20th 
century. Another study by Palmer and Raisanen (2002) analyzed the output of 19 
climate models, and predicted that wet winters will be five times more likely in northern 
and central Europe over the next century.  
A shift in the overall hazard exposure due to the occurrence of more frequent extreme 
events will lead to more frequent economic and social shocks at national and regional 
levels with possible consequences to the global economy. Although these shocks on 
average may not seem to be significant and are usually ignored within standard 
economic models, severe economic stagnation and instability of some regions may 
result from changes in the magnitude and frequency of extreme events. In particular, 
natural disasters in developing countries will be more catastrophic and more costly in 
human lives, all of which will possibly contribute to underdevelopment traps. 
There is an interesting paradox of increasing losses from natural catastrophes ― there is 
agreement that global risk exposure is becoming unsustainable and an inability to stop 
the growth of human and economic losses. The main structural reasons for increasing 
losses are the clustering of people and capital in hazard-prone areas as well as the 
creation of new hazard-prone and hazard creating areas. This is attributing to the 
increasing return phenomenon combined with the ignorance of rare-high consequence 
risks. On the social side, there are a number of reasons why there is a ‘supply shortage’ 
of loss reducing disaster management that are due to the public good character of 
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providing disaster management, high social discounting in geography and time of 
extreme events, and the complex and uncertain nature of the issue. Thus, current 
disaster trends are likely to continue to undermine the markets and safety nets of 
developing and developed countries.  
Catastrophes produce losses that are highly mutually dependent in space and time. This 
characteristic challenges the standard risk pooling concepts and the standard extremal 
value theory (Embrechts et al., 2000). The law of large numbers does not operate (in 
general), and the probability of ruin can be reduced not by just pooling risks, but only if 
insurers deliberately select the dependent fractions of catastrophic risks they will cover. 
The existing extremal value theory also deals primarily with independent events, 
assuming these events are quantifiable by a single number. Catastrophes are definitely 
not quantifiable events in this sense. They may have quite different spatial and temporal 
patterns, which cause significant heterogeneity of losses in space and time. These losses 
can be dramatically affected by risk mitigation decisions and loss spreading schemes 
within a country or on the international level through the insurance or financial markets.  
The main question in connection with catastrophes is the management of losses. Until 
recently, they were mainly absorbed by the immediate victims and their governments 
(Gilber and Gouy, 1998; Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola, 2000). The insurance 
industry and its premium payers (and investors) also absorb a portion of catastrophic 
losses, but even in the wealthy countries this share is relatively small. As current losses 
increase, the governments are concerned with escalating costs for disaster prevention, 
response, compensation to victims, and public infrastructure repair. It is important to 
increase the responsibility of individuals and local governments for the risks and their 
consequences. Local governments may be more effective in the evaluation and 
enforcement of loss-reduction and loss-spreading measures, but this is possible only 
through location-specific analysis of potential losses, the mutual interdependencies of 
these losses, and the sensitivities of the losses to new land use and other risk 
management strategies.  
In the following text we discuss an integrated framework that enables us to analyze 
spatial and temporal heterogeneity of various agents (stakeholders) induced by mutually 
dependent losses from extreme events. The model explicitly addresses the specifics of 
catastrophic risks ― the lack of information, the need for long-term perspectives and 
geographically explicit models, and the involvement of various agents such as 
individuals, governments, farmers, producers, consumers, insurers, reinsurers, and 
investors. The model combines geographically explicit data on the distribution of 
properties in a studied region with a stochastic catastrophic model generating 
magnitudes, timing, and location of catastrophes. The integrated catastrophic risk 
management approach, as presented in this paper, is likely to offer more coherent, 
comprehensive and robust policy responses. Coherence is needed between economists, 
development planners, natural scientists and disaster managers; and comprehensiveness 
is required in order to identify the policy gaps between the existing measures in place 
compared to those needed to guarantee economic development that is robust against 
shocks from catastrophes. For these purposes, the model embeds the stochastic 
optimization procedure that allows to analyze robust optimal portfolios of ex-ante (land 
use, structural mitigation, insurance) and ex-post (adaptation, rehabilitation, borrowing) 
measures for decreasing regional vulnerability measured in terms of economic, 
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financial, and human losses as well as welfare growth indicators. The approach is 
illustrated in recent case studies of seismic and flood risk management.  
3 A Simple Risk Management Model 
Catastrophic events such as floods, earthquakes, and windstorms occur abruptly in time 
and space as “spikes” that cannot be properly modeled on “average”. The following risk 
management models address this “abruptness” feature of catastrophes. 
Let us consider a simple model of growth under abrupt shocks, which is a stylized 
version of the insurance business (Borch, 1962; Daykin et al., 1994; Grandell, 1991). 
The main variable of concern is the risk reserve tr  at time t : ttt Arr −pi+= 0 , 0≥t , 
where tpi , tA  are aggregated premiums and claims, and 0r  is the initial risk reserve. 
The process ∑=
=
)(
1
tN
k k
t SA , where )(tN , 0≥t  are a random number of claims in 
interval ],0[ t  (e.g., a Poisson process) with 0)0( =N , and { }∞1kS  is a sequence of 
independent and identically distributed random variables (claims) ― in other words, 
replicates of a random variable S . In this model, the inflow of premiums tpi  pushes tr  
up, whereas the random outflow tA  pushes tr  down.  
The main problem of catastrophic management is to avoid the situation when tr  drops 
abruptly below the “vital” level (ruin) ― in our example, equal to 0. It is definitely only 
possible with a certain probability { }0  ,  somefor  0 >≤=Ψ ttrP t . 
 
t
t
r
0r
t
t
t
A
r
r
−pi+
= 0
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Figure 1: Trajectory of the risk reserve tr  subject to the random process of claims. 
The deterministic approach is very simplified, as illustrated by the following 
calculations. Assume that )(tN , kS , are independent, )(tN  has intensity α , i.e., 
{ } ttNE α=)( , and tt pi=pi , 0>pi . Then the expected profit over the interval ],0[ t  is 
( )tSE α−pi )( , that is, the expected profit increases in time for 0)( >α−pi SE . Thus, the 
practical deterministic model ignores complex interdependencies among the timing of 
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claims (temporal clustering), their sizes, and the subsequent possibility of ruin, 0≤tr . 
In this formulation the richer random jumping process tr  is replaced by a linear 
function in t , ( ) tESrr t  0 α−pi+= . The difference ESα−pi  is the “safety loading”. It 
follows from the strong law of large numbers that [ ] [ ]EStAtt α−pi→−pi /  with the 
probability of 1. Therefore, in the case of positive safety loading, ESα>pi , we have to 
expect that the real random profit tt A−pi  for a sufficiently large t  would also be 
positive under the appropriate choice of premium ESαρ+=pi )1( , where ρ  is the 
“relative safety” loading ESES αα−pi=ρ /)( . But this holds only if ruin does not occur 
before time t .  
As illustrated in Figure 2, despite the fact that sustained growth of risk reserves tr  is 
guaranteed on average, the ruin of the real growth process may occur before sustained 
growth takes off. In other words, the substitution of the complex jumping process by a 
simple deterministic model (showing “robust” sustained growth) may lead to 
unforeseen collapses (surprises). In other words, only a stochastic model shows the 
necessity for a certain assistance of growth, at least in the form of such purely financial 
risk management measures as borrowing, contingent credits, or governmental bailouts. 
It is also possible to reduce the severity of the distribution of claims by various loss 
reduction mitigation measures. However, all of this is only possible by analyzing the 
probability of ruin Ψ . In general, various decision variables affect Ψ . The claim size 
S  depends on the coverage of the insurer operating on geographically distinct locations. 
Important decision variables are 0r , pi , and reinsurance arrangements. The reduction of 
Ψ  to acceptable levels can be viewed as the so-called chance constraint stochastic 
optimization problem (see Ermoliev and Wets, 1988; Prekopa, 1995). The complexity is 
associated with the jumping process tA  with analytically intractable dependencies of 
tA  on decision variables, which requires specific stochastic optimization (STO) 
methods.  
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Figure 2: Expected and real growth of the risk reserve. There is an exit scenario due to 
an extreme event at time τ , which depletes the safety loading. 
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4 A Stochastic Integrated Catastrophe Management Model 
Section 3 only briefly outlined some methodological complexities of the catastrophe 
management model. This section aims at a more comprehensive description of the 
inherent problem elements. A model for integrated catastrophe management consists, in 
principle, of two major submodels, a catastrophe model and an economic multi-agent 
model. The catastrophe model (earthquake, flood, etc.), is based on Monte Carlo 
simulations of geographically explicit catastrophe patterns and related direct losses in 
selected regions (a discussion of these models is beyond the scope of this paper but can 
be found elsewhere, see Amendola et al., 2000b; Baranov et al., 2002; Ermoliev et al., 
2000a, b; Rozenberg et al., 2001; Walker, 1997). The economic multi-agent model is a 
multiregional stochastic dynamic welfare growth model (for the analyses of abrupt 
economic shocks see, e.g., Ermoliev et al., 2000a, b). This model maps spatial 
economic losses into gains and losses of agents. These agents are the central 
government, a mandatory catastrophe insurance (pool), an investor, “individuals” (cells 
or regions), producers (farmers), etc. 
A catastrophe would ruin many agents if their risk exposures were not properly 
managed. To design safe catastrophic risk management strategies it is necessary to 
define location specific feasible decisions based on potential losses generated by a 
catastrophe model. Some of these decisions reduce the frequencies (likelihood) and 
magnitudes of catastrophic events (say, land-use decisions) and redistribute losses and 
gains on local and international levels (say, pools, insurance, compensation schemes, 
credits, borrowings). The crucial question is the use of appropriate risk measures, e.g., 
to avoid bankruptcy. Catastrophic losses often have a multimode distribution, and 
therefore the use of mean values (e.g., expected costs and profits) may be misleading. 
Roughly speaking, we cannot think in terms of aggregate regional losses and gains as 
the sum of location specific losses and gains (e.g., if the mean value is substituted by the 
median). Besides this, the number of alternative decisions may be very large. Thus, for 
a region with only 10 possible sub-locations and 10 alternative sizes of insurance 
coverage, the number of possible combinations is 1010 . The straightforward evaluation 
of all alternatives by calculating the damages of location specific values, etc., may 
easily exceed 100 years, which calls for the use of a spatial optimization technique that 
enables the design of desirable robust solutions without evaluating all of the possible 
alternatives. The model of this section reflects all this and it emphasizes the collective 
nature of catastrophe risk management.  
Assume that the study region is divided into sub-regions or cells mj ,1= . A cell may 
correspond to a collection of households, a zone with similar seismic activity, a 
watershed, a grid with a segment of a gas pipeline, etc. The choice of cells provides a 
desirable representation of losses. For each cell j  an estimate exists of its “wealth” at 
time t  that may include the value of the infrastructure, houses, factories, etc. A 
sequence of random catastrophic events { }1,0, −=ω=ω Ttt  affects different cells 
mj ,1=  and generates at each 1,0 −= Tt  mutually dependent losses )(ωtjL , i.e., 
damages of wealth at j , T  is a time horizon. These losses can be modified by various 
decision variables. Some of the decisions reduce losses, for instance a dike, whereas 
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others spread them on a regional, national, and international level, e.g., insurance 
contracts, catastrophe securities, credits, and financial aid. If x  is the vector of the 
decision variables, then losses )(ωtjL  are transformed into ),( ωxLtj . For example, we 
can think of ),( ωxLtj  as )(ωtjL  being affected by the decisions of the insurance to 
cover losses from a layer ],[ 21 jj xx  at a cell j  in the case of a disaster at time t : 
[ ]{ } tjjtjjjtjtj xLxxLxL pi++−ω=ω 121 ,min,max)(),( , 
where [ ]{ } 121 ,min,max jtjjj xLxx −  are retained by insurance losses, and tjpi  is the 
premium. 
In the most general case, vector x  comprises decision variables of different agents, 
including governmental decisions, such as the height of a new dike or a public 
compensation scheme defined by a fraction of total losses ∑ =mj tjL1 . The insurance 
decisions concern the premiums paid by individuals and the payment of claims in the 
case of a catastrophe. There are complex interdependencies among these decisions, 
which call for the cooperation of agents. For example, the partial compensation of 
catastrophe losses by the government enforces decisions on loss reductions by 
individuals and, hence, increases the insurability of risks, and helps the insurance to 
avoid insolvency. On the other hand, the insurance combined with risk-reduction 
measures can reduce losses, compensations and governmental debt and stabilize the 
economic growth of the region and the wealth of individuals. 
Catastrophe losses are shared by many participants, such as individuals (cells), 
governments, insurers, reinsurers, and investors. In the model we call them “agents” as 
the main balance equations of our model are similar for all of them. For each agent i  a 
variable of concern is the wealth tiW  at time Tt ,0=    
),(),(),()(1 ω−ω+ω=ω+ xOxIxWW titititi ,  ni ,1= , 1,0 −= Tt , Ω∈ω , (1) 
where 0iW  is the initial wealth. This is a rather general process of accumulation that, 
depending on the interpretation, describes the accumulation of reserve funds, the 
dynamics of contamination, or the processes of economic growth with random 
disturbances (shocks), the reserves of the insurance company at moment t , the gross 
national product of a country or the accumulated wealth of a specific region. In more 
general cases, when catastrophes may have profound effects on economic growth (can 
“move” the economy, see, for example, Nordhaus, 1993; Manne and Richels, 1992), 
this model can be generalized to an appropriate version of an economic-demographic 
model (MacKellar and Ermolieva, 1999) that enables to represent the movements of 
individuals and the capital accumulation processes within the economy.  
We use the same index i  for quite different agents. Therefore, the variables ),( ωxI ti , 
),( ωxO ti  may have quite different meanings. For example, for each insurer i  we can 
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think of tiI  as premiums 
t
ipi  which are ex-ante arranged and do not depend on ω , 
whereas tiO  is defined by the claim size 
t
iS  and possible transaction costs, which 
triggers a random jump of the risk reserve tiW  downwards at random times of 
catastrophic events (as in the simple model described in Section 2). If i  corresponds to 
a cell, then income tiI  may be affected by a catastrophic event ω  generated by a 
catastrophe model. The incomes tiI  can be defined by a set of scenarios or through a 
regional growth model with a geographically explicit distribution of capital among the 
cells. The term tiO  may include losses 
t
iL , taxes and premiums paid by i . For the 
central or local governmental agent i  (e.g., mandatory insurance, catastrophe fund) tiI  
may include a portion of taxes collected by the government (compensations of losses by 
the government), and tiO  may consist of mitigation costs, debts, loans and fees paid for 
ex-ante contingent credits.  
For each i  consider a stopping time iτ for process ),( ωxW ti , i.e., a random variable 
with integer values Tt ,0= . The event { }ti =τω :  with fixed t  corresponds to the 
decision to stop process ),( ωxW ti  after time t . Examples of iτ  may be Ti =τ , the time 
of the first catastrophe, or the time of the ruin before a given time 
T : [ ]{ }0,0),(:min,min),( ><ω=ωτ txWtTx tii . The last example defines iτ  as a rather 
complex implicit function of x .  
Assume that each agent i  maximizes (possibly negative) “wealth” at it τ= . The notion 
of wealth at t  requires an exact definition, as it must represent in a sense the whole 
probability distribution of tiW . The traditional expected value 
t
iEW  may not be 
appropriate for the probability distributions of tiW  affected by rare catastrophes with 
high consequences. As a result, they may have a multimode structure with “heavy tails”. 
We can think of a maximal value tiV , which does not overestimate, in a sense, the 
random value tiW , i.e., cases when ( ) 0),(min <−ω≤ titits VqW . Formally, tiV  can be 
chosen by maximizing: 
{ }VxWEV ti −ωγ+ ),(,0min ,  (2) 
or the more general function ( )VxWEdV ti −ωγ− ),( , for some function 0)  ( ≥⋅d ,  
10 <γ< , where the second term can be considered as the risk of overestimating wealth 
),( ωxW si  for ts ,...,1,0= . Let us note that the concept of equation (2) corresponds to the 
well-known Conditional Value at Risk (CvaR) risk measure (see Artzner et al., 1999; 
Jobst and Zenios, 2001; Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000). For the normal distribution 
and 2/1=γ , the value tiV  maximizing equation (2) coincides with the traditional mean 
value tiEW . It is easy to see that with a quadratic function )  ( ⋅d  we can also achieve the 
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mean-variance efficiency as in Markowitz (1987). Besides the maximization of wealth, 
the agent i  is concerned with the risk of insolvency, i.e., when 0<siW  for some 
ts ,...,1,0=  as well as the lack of sustained growth, i.e., when 0<− si
s
i OI  for some 
ts ,...,1,0= . In accordance with this, consider the stochastic goal functions: 
[ ]{ } { }
[ ]{ }
  ),(),(min0,min                     
),(min,0min),(min,0min),,(
2
31
ω−ωβ+
+ωδ+−ωγ+=ω
∈
∈∈
xOxI
xWVxWVVxf
s
i
s
iTsi
s
iTsi
s
i
s
iTsi
t
i
t
i
t
tt
   
),,(),( ),( ω= ωτ VxEfVxF xii i ,  (3) 
where ktT , 3,2,1=k , is a subset of time moments in interval ],0[ t , e.g., all points, 
tT =τ  or some other “critical” moments; non negative iγ , iδ , and iβ  are substitution 
coefficients between wealth tiV  and risks of overestimating wealth, insolvency, and 
overestimating sustained growth. All these requirements reflect survival and stability 
constraints of agents. Let us notice that in equation (3) we use a significantly modified 
form of equation (2), which seems to be more appropriate for dynamic problems 
involving catastrophic risks. The operation min with respect to ts ≤  orients towards the 
extremal in time values. Each agent attempts to maximize ),( VxFi . 
Pareto optimal improvements of risk situations with respect to goal functions ),( VxFi  
of different agents can be achieved by maximizing:  
∑α=
=
n
i
ii VxFVxW
1
),(),(   (4) 
for different weights 0≥iα , ∑
=
=
n
i i1
1α . These weights reflect the importance of the 
agents. The maximization of ),( VxW  for different weights iα , ni ,1= , corresponds to a 
stochastic version of the welfare analysis (Ginsburg and Keyzer, 1997). The 
minimization of the function in equation (4) is a stochastic maximin problem (see 
Ermoliev and Wets, 1988). The resulting optimal strategy takes into account the goals 
of quite different agents, in particular, their goals to increase welfare, decrease risks of 
insolvency, and improve stability of growth. It also takes into account different ex-ante 
and ex-post decisions. In this sense, we say the optimal strategy is to be robust. Detailed 
analysis of the model can be found in Ermolieva et al., (1997, 2000). Let us discuss its 
applications in some case studies. 
5 Case Studies: Catastrophic Risk Management 
The adequacy of the methodology was tested in a number of case studies. In its first 
application, the integrated model analyzed the insurability of risks in the Irkutsk region 
in Russia, which is exposed to the risks of earthquakes (Amendola et al., 2000a). The 
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results demonstrated the model’s capability of generating insurance strategies that are 
robust with respect to dependencies and uncertainties induced by the catastrophes, thus 
reducing the risk of bankruptcy to the insurers. 
In the second case study (Ermolieva et al., 2000), the integrated model was customized 
for catastrophic flood management, in which case it consisted of a catastrophe model 
and a Multi-Agent Economic Model (MAAS). The “River” module of the catastrophe 
model calculated the volume of discharged water into the pilot region from different 
river sections for given land-use practices, heights of dikes, scenarios of their failures or 
removals, precipitation patterns, while the spatial GIS-based Inundation module mapped 
water released from the river into levels of standing water and thus it can estimate the 
area of the region affected by the flood. The direct economic losses were calculated in a 
“Vulnerability” module. This module could, in principle, incorporate possible cascading 
effects, such as floods causing unavailability of lifeline systems and its consequences. It 
also included loss reduction measures thereby increasing the sustainability of the region 
towards floods, e.g., changes in land-use, flood preparedness measures, etc. Further, the 
MAAS module enabled the calculation of economic losses and gains for different 
agents, such as individuals, local governments, mandatory or voluntary catastrophic 
insurance, central government, and investors. Integrated all together, the models 
resulted in a framework that was capable of transforming spatial probabilistic scenarios 
of rains, dike failures, risk reduction measures and risk spreading schemes into 
histograms (probability distributions) of gains and losses, and underpayments and 
overpayments of agents.   
The case study for a seismic-prone Italian region presented here illustrates the fact that 
neither the market nor the government may be considered as the efficient mechanism 
for catastrophic risk management. Only some form of a public-private partnership 
would be appropriate (Kunreuther and Roth, 1998).  
Many governments are pursuing policies to reduce their role in compensating victims. 
Nevertheless, a study by Linnerooth-Bayer and Amendola (2000) confirms that the 
victims and their governments bear the major losses from natural disasters and, 
worldwide, there is only moderate risk transfer with insurance. An important 
consideration for national insurance strategies is linking private insurance with 
mitigation measures to reduce losses. Insurers, however, are reluctant to enter markets 
that expose them to the risk of bankruptcy. In the USA, for example, many insurers 
pulled out of catastrophic risk markets in response to their large losses from natural 
catastrophes in the last decade (ISO, 1994).  
In Italy, a law for integrating insurance in the overall risk management process was 
proposed only in late 1997 (within the Design of Law 2793: “Measures for the 
Stabilization of Public Finance”). This opened a debate, which has not yet been 
concluded by a legislative act. Therefore, policy options for a national insurance 
strategy are still open to investigation.  
In these studies, we incorporated the data provided by the Institute for Research on 
Seismic Risk (Petrini, 1995) into a Monte Carlo earthquake generator, which was 
created (see Amendola et al., 2000a, b; Baranov et al., 2002; Ermoliev et al., 2000a, b; 
Rozenberg et al., 2001) using Gütenberg–Richter law and the attenuation characteristics 
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of the region (see Figure 3). The generator, in fact, can be easily adapted to incorporate 
different kinds of distributions, non-poissonian catastrophic processes, as well as micro 
zoning within a municipality.  
The Tuscany region was subdivided into M ≈ 300 sub-regions, which corresponded to 
the number of its municipalities. For each municipality j  the number and types of 
buildings, their vulnerability, and number of built cubic meters represented the so-called 
estimate of “wealth” jW . Simulated in time and space, earthquakes tωω ,...,0  occurred 
at different municipalities, inside or outside the region, had random magnitudes and, 
therefore, affected a random number of municipalities.  
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Earthquake generator. 
The economic losses of destroyed cubic meters of a building were defined as the cost for 
their reconstruction. Obviously, the reinforcement of a building’s environment would 
reduce the losses. This fact was adequately reflected in the model, which allowed to 
study the interplay between mitigation measures and risk-sharing mechanisms 
(insurance, reinsurance, financial markets). The concern of this study was the following. 
In its early version, the 1998 Italian Design of Law 2793 to reduce the impact of natural 
disasters on the governmental budget included in its Article 31bis provisions for an 
insurance program against all natural hazards (Amendola et al., 2000b). It was not 
intended to make this insurance mandatory, but to make mandatory the extension of a 
fire insurance policy for all natural hazards. In addition to tax incentives for such an 
insurance, it stipulated a maximum exclusion layer of 25%, the creation of a pool of 
insurance companies with an appropriate reserve fund, e.g., corresponding to the annual 
average government payment for compensating losses (with some forms of state 
guarantee to be specified further), and linking the premium to that for fire policy. This 
article was withdrawn, and later proposals are still the subject of discussion.  
Starting from these principles, the model analyzed various policies that were suggested 
by stakeholders. It also offered optimal and sustained solutions in the sense of indicators 
that were defined in Section 4. We assumed that an insurance company (this might be a 
pool of companies or the government itself acting as an insurer) covered a fraction q , 
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e.g., q  = 0.75 of earthquake losses. The rest, q−=ν 1  according to the Design of Law, 
was compensated by the state. Thus, in the case of excessive losses the state could be 
severely affected.  
The policy options proposed were, for example, on insurance premiums. Standard 
actuarial approaches calculate the premiums based on the expected losses. The proposed 
options followed similar principles. In the outlined numerical experiments we consider 
the following three rules: 
1. Premiums based on the average damage over all of the municipalities (solidarity 
principle, bringing less exposed locations to pay premiums equal to those more 
severely exposed, as in the spirit of the proposed insurance program). 
2. Location-specific premiums based on average damage in the particular municipality, 
i.e., risk-based premiums. 
However, the use of average losses may be misleading in the case of heavy tailed 
distributions that are typical for catastrophic losses. The stochastic optimization risk 
management model outlined in Section 4 allows the calculation of premiums taking into 
account sustainability indicators of insurers and the state, constraints on individual 
incomes, willingness to overpay premiums, etc. These model-based robust premiums 
were implied as the third policy option: 
3. Premiums that fairly equalize the risk of instability for the insurance company (the 
insurer may become bankrupt only once in 1000 years) and the risk of premium 
overpayment for exposed municipalities (municipalities overpay premiums only 
once in 100 years).  
Besides premiums, we also analyzed policy options on location specific coverages and 
the amount of governmental compensation.  
Figures 4–7 illustrate some numerical results. They show considerable differences 
between Options 1, 2 and Option 3. The number of simulations is shown on the vertical 
axis.  
For Option 1, where the burden of losses is equally distributed over the population, the 
simulation of catastrophic losses showed that the annual premium is equal to the flat 
rate of 0.02 monetary units (m. u.) per cubic meter of building. 
For Option 2, Figure 4 shows the distribution of municipality-specific premiums based 
on average damage in each municipality (or according to the municipality-specific risk). 
There is a prevailing number of municipalities (about 220) that have to pay 0.02–0.03 
m. u., which is close to the flat rate of 0.02, as in Option 1. About 20 municipalities are 
at no risk at all (0 rate). Municipalities that are more exposed to risk have to pay 0.04 
and higher rates (more than 50 municipalities).    
Figure 6 shows the distribution of the insurers’ reserve (cumulated at τ  within 50 years) 
at Options 1, 2 premiums. The volume of capital is shown on the horizontal axis. The 
probability of insolvency (when the risk reserve accumulated up to the catastrophe is 
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not enough to compensate incurred losses) is indicated on the right-hand ordinate axis. 
There is a rather high probability of ‘small’ insolvency (values -90, -40 occurred 190 
and 90 times out of 500 fast simulations). High solvency (more than 500 m. u.) occurred 
in about 10 per cent of the simulations. The size of insolvency would represent the cost 
to the government to cover the losses uncovered by the pool. Another option may be to 
transfer a fraction of the losses to international financial markets, as analyzed in 
Ermolieva et al., 2000. 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 More
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 More
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
 
Figure 4: Distribution of municipality-  Figure 5: Distribution of “fair” premiums, 
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Figure 6: Distribution of insurer’s reserve, Options 1, 2 (thousands m. u., 50 years). 
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Figure 7: Distribution of insurers’ reserve, Option 3 (monetary thousands, over 50 
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Figure 8: Comparison of Options: municipality-specific, “fair” and flat (0.02) 
premiums. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of premiums for Option 3. According to this principle, 
most of the municipalities (190) have to pay close to the flat rate of 0.02–0.03 m. u. per 
cubic meter of a building. Rates of 0.04 and higher have to be paid by about 100 
municipalities. In this case, the highest premium rate is 0.5, which is much lower when 
compared to the highest rate of 1.2 of Option 2. The distribution of the insurer’s reserve 
in Figure 7 also indicates the improvement of the insurer’s stability ― the frequency of 
insolvency is considerably reduced. 
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Figure 8 is very illustrative. For each municipality, it shows the optional premiums to be 
paid ― the flat premium rate of 0.02, the Option 2 municipality-specific rate, and the 
‘fair’ premium of Option 3. Many municipalities in all three options have to pay the 
premium rate, which is about the flat rate (0.015–0.03). For quite a number of 
municipalities in Options 2, the rate significantly exceeds the flat rate. For these 
municipalities, special attention should be given as to whether they are able to pay such 
high premiums. Option 3 allows taking such individual constraints on overpayments 
into account and working out the efficient premiums both for the insurer and the 
municipalities.  
6 Pertinence of Integrated Disaster Management Models 
for Analyzing Climate Change 
Managing the risk of climate change can be regarded as a special type of integrated 
disaster management. Although technically the same phasing of the disaster cycle 
applies ― mitigation/prevention, preparedness, response and recovery ― the sheer 
scale over time, geography and scope together with a different political/economic 
setting, makes risk management of climate change a different beast. Therefore, 
regulatory approaches, be it endogenously generated or externally enforced, to climate 
change are especially prone to failure. Michaelson (1998) presents three main reasons 
for failure due to deficiencies in current regulatory policy practice: 
• Global warming is an absent problem, and thus deniable and discounted. In the 
absence of tangible evidence, it is politically tenable to do nothing, especially in 
light of uncertainty regarding how much and what type of action is required. 
• Global warming is a difficult problem to solve ― it is costly, unevenly distributed, 
complex, debatable in scope, and ill matched to our policymaking apparatus. A great 
deal of motivation is needed, therefore, to achieve any meaningful progress. 
• Global warming presents a tragedy of the commons, so that even if international 
actors were prepared and competent to act, they would have a structural disincentive 
to do so. 
In addition, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the character of climate change 
has historically been characterized by large-scale abrupt climate changes due to a 
powerful feedback mechanism within a tremendously complex climate system. These 
abrupt climate changes occurred even without such dramatic changes of the climate 
system such as the current changes of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. 
These are unprecedented challenges to scientists, practitioners, agencies and policy 
makers involved in the management of climate risks. A precondition for a robust 
regulatory framework is sound decision theory that reflects the above-mentioned 
challenges. We conclude that the class of models presented in this paper appears to be 
suitable. Let us discuss a number of features of the climate change problem and its 
associated social dilemma that so far have not been well analyzed in integrated 
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assessments, which we will be able to tackle, however, with the help of the models 
presented in this paper. 
As mentioned in the introduction, abrupt climate change is a field that is still largely 
under-explored by the integrated assessment community. Technically, abrupt climate 
change occurs when the climate system is forced to cross some threshold, triggering a 
transition to a new state at a rate determined by the climate system itself and faster than 
its causes. The complex processes in the climate system may allow the cause of such an 
abrupt climate change to be undetectably small (NRC, 2002). This leads to a situation 
where extreme events of the climate system, its associated risks and mutual dependency 
of extremal values, can only be assessed imperfectly. Ignorance arises from the very 
nature of the complex climate system per se and its interaction with socioeconomic 
systems. In this paper, we have illustrated that it is possible to account for extreme 
events and the ambiguities. In particular, the notion of developing robust strategies in an 
environment of uncertain risk appears to be a valuable concept for analysis.    
Another serious problem arises from the granularity of hazard and vulnerability in space 
and time. Due to correlation, be it linear or non-linear, between individually non-
catastrophic risks the ensemble may bear the potential for a catastrophe. Extreme 
events, like flooding or a storm, can be handled as single events. However, the 
globalized and increasingly integrated economy of today gives risk to powerful and 
many times hidden feedback mechanisms. An interesting case is that of the crisis of the 
reinsurance industry. Throughout most of the 90s, when stock markets were riding high 
and insurance claims were manageable, business focus was much on enlarging market 
share leading to fierce competition. Unrealistic expectations about the Information 
Technology (IT)-based wonder economy lead to a situation where shrinking premium 
income was not offset by investment gains. Apart from the irony that earnings from the 
fossil fuel biased investment portfolio (another correlated risk) were very high, 
increased competition lead to situations where insurance companies had to repeatedly 
dip into their reserves. Then, at the end of the 90s when trust in sustained economic 
growth began fade away and the industry had to pick up the 9.11 event and the 
relatively mild flood losses in Europe, large losses had to be announced by the 
reinsurance industry. Thus, the combined effect of falling stock markets, partly 
triggered or reinforced by insured catastrophes, unrealistic premiums and underwriting 
practices due to wrong investment expectations and temporal clustering of independent 
calamities, can wipe out much of the industry’s capital, leading to questionable 
robustness of the entire industry downstream and its customers. Spatial and temporal 
dependencies of risks have successfully been treated in the case studies presented in this 
paper and technically it should also be feasible to do within the integrated models of 
climate change. 
There is not only a great deal of ignorance about risk exposure due to climate change, 
but risk is also not independent from our decisions. Climate risk is endogenously 
managed by human response, be it ex-ante or ex-post. As discussed, the responses are 
mitigation and adaptation measures, where mitigation measures can be more associated 
with hazard reduction and adaptation measures are aimed more at vulnerability 
management. Risk mitigating and risk containing actions are induced by society's 
reaction vis-à-vis the risks it endogenously co-creates. Despite this simple insight, 
integrated models of climate risk management still do not deal with the endogeneity 
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problem.  On the other hand, in this paper we have shown that the risks can be 
endogenized, which, however, leads to methodologically very demanding model 
structures. We are convinced that integrated models of climate change can only be used 
as an useful “mitigation measure” if risks are treated fully endogenously.  
Most of the integrated assessment work on climate change has focused on the technical 
details of mitigation and adaptation strategies. It must be recognized that global climate 
change will, in all probability, have tremendous long-term social consequences and, 
therefore, new strategies for societal planning, governance and management have to be 
developed. Models that facilitate stakeholder consultation in an effective way are highly 
desirable. The types of models presented here are capable of representing a variety of 
stakeholder groups in an agent-based setting. Using appropriate catastrophic risk 
management models and methods allows us to analyze various ex-ante burden-sharing 
arrangements while paying attention to all measures of the disaster cycle (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, recovery) and assign responsibilities as well as analyze trade 
offs in close cooperation with stakeholders. 
References 
Adams, J., M.A. Maslin and E. Thomas (1999). Sudden Climate Transitions During the 
Quaternary. Progress in Physical Geography, 23, 1, 1–36.  
Amendola, A., Y. Ermoliev, T. Ermolieva, V. Gitits, G. Koff and J. Linnerooth-Bayer 
(2000a). A Systems Approach to Modeling Catastrophic Risk and Insurability. 
Natural Hazards Journal, 21, Issue 2/3, 381–393.  
Amendola, A., Y. Ermoliev and T. Ermolieva (2000b). Earthquake Risk Management: 
A Case Study for an Italian Region. In: Proceedings of the Second Euro 
Conference on Global Change and Catastrophe Risk Management: Earthquake 
Risks in Europe, 6-9 July 2000. International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Artzner, P., F. Delbaen, J.-M. Eber and D. Heath (1999). Coherent Measures of Risk. 
Mathematical Finance, 9/3, 203–228. 
Baranov, S., B. Digas, T. Ermolieva and V. Rozenberg (2002). Earthquake Risk 
Management: Scenario Generator. Interim Report IR-02-025. International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Borch, K. (1962). Equilibrium in a Reinsurance Market. Econometrica, 30/3, 424–444. 
Daykin, C., T. Pentikainen and M. Pesonen (1994). Practical Risk Theory for Actuaries. 
Monographs on Statistics and Applied Probability, Volume 53, Chapman and Hall 
Ltd., London, UK. 
Embrechts, P., C. Klueppelberg and T. Mikosch (2000). Modeling Extremal Events for 
Insurance and Finance: Applications of Mathematics Stochastic Modeling and 
Applied Probability. Volume 33, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg, Germany.  
Energy Journal (1999).  The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol:  A Multi-model Evaluation. 
Energy Journal, Special Issue, 391–398. 
 20
Ermoliev, Y. and R. Wets (eds.) (1988). Numerical Techniques of Stochastic 
Optimization: Computational Mathematics. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany.  
Ermoliev, Y., T. Ermolieva, G. MacDonald and V. Norkin (2000a). Insurability of 
Catastrophic Risks: The Stochastic Optimization Model. Optimization Journal, 
47, 251–265. 
Ermoliev, Y., T. Ermolieva, G. MacDonald and V. Norkin, (2000b). Stochastic 
Optimization of Insurance Portfolios for Managing Exposure to Catastrophic 
Risks. Annals of Operations Research, 99, 207–225. 
Ermolieva, T. (1997). The Design of Optimal Insurance Decisions in the Presence of 
Catastrophic Risks. Interim Report IR-97-068. International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.  
Ermolieva, T., Y. Ermoliev and V. Norkin (1997). Spatial Stochastic Model for 
Optimization Capacity of Insurance Networks Under Dependent Catastrophic 
Risks: Numerical Experiments. Interim Report IR-97-028. International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Ermolieva, T., Y. Ermoliev and I. Galambos (2000). Integrated Approach to 
Catastrophic Flood Management: Summary of the Modeling Efforts. Draft Report 
to the Second Meeting of the Advisory Committee on “Flood Risk Management 
Policy in the Upper Tisza Basin: A Systems Analytical Approach”, 11 December. 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Fischer, G., M. Shah and H. van Velthuizen (2002). Climate Change and Agricultural 
Vulnerability. Report commissioned by the United Nations for the Johannesburg 
Summit. Available on the Internet: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/JB-
Report.pdf.  
Gilber, C. and C. Gouy (1998). Flood Management in France. In: U. Rosenthal and P. 
t’Hart (eds.), Flood Response and Crisis Management in Western Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany. 
Ginsburg, V. and M. Keyzer (1997). The Structure of Applied General Equilibrium 
Models. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA.  
Grandell, J. (1991). Aspects of Risk Theory. Springer Series on Statistics: Probability 
and Its Applications, Springer Verlag, New York/Berlin/Heidelberg. 
Gritsevskii, A. and N. Nakicenovic (2000). Modeling Uncertainty of Induced 
Technological Change.  Energy Policy, 28, 907–921. 
Heal, G. and B. Kriström (2002). Uncertainty and Climate Change. Mimeo. Columbia 
University, USA, November 2001, revised February 2002. Available on the 
Internet: http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gheal/General%20Interest%20Pap 
ers/climaterevew.pdf.  
IPCC TAR (2001). Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report. Intergovernmental Panel 
for Climate Change, Third Assessment Report (IPCC TAR), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. Available on the Internet: http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
pub/tar/syr/001.htm.   
ISO (1994). The Impact of Catastrophes on Property Insurance. Insurance Service 
Office (ISO), New York, USA. 
 21
Jobst, N. and S. Zenios (2001). The Tail that Wags the Dog: Integrating Credit Risk in 
Asset Portfolios. Journal of Risk Finance, Fall, 31–43. 
Kunreuther, H. and R. Roth (eds.) (1998). Paying the Price: The Status and Role of 
Insurance Against Natural Disasters in the United States. Joseph Henry Press, 
Washington DC, USA.  
Linnerooth-Bayer, J. and A. Amendola (2000). Global Change, Catastrophic Risk and 
Loss Spreading. The GENEVA PAPERS on Risk and Insurance, 25/2, 203–219. 
MacKellar, L. and T. Ermolieva (1999). The IIASA Social Security Project 
Multiregional Economic-Demographic Growth Model: Policy Background and 
Algebraic Structure. Interim Report IR-99-007. International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.   
Manne, A. and R. Richels (1992). Buying Greenhouse Insurance: The Economic Costs 
of CO2 Emission Limits. MIT Press, Cambridge, USA. 
Markowitz, H. (1987). Mean Variance Analysis in Portfolio Choice and Capital 
Markets. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK. 
Mastrandrea, M.D. and S.H. Schneider (2001). Integrated Assessment of Abrupt 
Climate Changes.  Climate Policy, 1, 433.  
Michaelson, J. (1998). Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhattan Project.  Stanford 
Environmental Law Journal, January.  Available on the Internet: http://www.meta 
tronics.net/lit/geo2.html. 
Milly, P., R. Wetherald, K. Dunne and T. Delworth (2002). Increasing Risk of Great 
Floods in Changing Climate. Nature, 415, 512–514. 
Nordhaus, W. (1993).  Rolling the ‘DICE’: An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling 
Greenhouse Gases.  Resource and Energy Economics, 15, 27–50.  
NRC (2002). Abrupt Climate Change ― Inevitable Surprises. National Research 
Council, National Academy Press, Washington DC, USA. 
Obersteiner, M. with contributing authors: C. Azar, S. Kossmeier, R. Mechler, K. 
Möllersten, S. Nilsson, P. Read, Y. Yamagata and J. Yan (2001). Managing 
Climate Risk. Interim Report IR-01-051. International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
Palmer, T. and J. Raisanen (2002). Quantifying the Risk of Extreme Seasonal 
Precipitation Events in a Changing Climate. Nature, 415, 512–514.  
Petrini, V. (1995). Pericolosita’ sismica e prime valutazioni di rischio in Toscana 
(Seismic Hasards and Preliminary Risk Evaluation in Tuscany). Consiglio 
Nazionale delle Ricerche/Istituto per la Ricerca sul Rischio Sismico (CNR/IRRS, 
National Research Council/Seismin Risk Research Institute), Milan, Italy.  
Prekopa, A. (1995). Stochastic Programming. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 
Netherlands.  
Rockafellar, T. and S. Uryasev (2000). Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk. The 
Journal of Risk, 2/3, 21–41. 
 22
Rozenberg, V., T. Ermolieva and M. Blizorukova (2001). Modeling Earthquakes via 
Computer Programs. Interim Report IR-01-068. International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria.  
Taylor, K.C., R.B. Alley, G.A. Doyle, P.M. Grootes, P.A. Mayewski, G.W. Lamorey, 
J.W.C. White and L.K. Barlow (1993). The ‘Flickering Switch’ of Late 
Pleistocene Climate Change. Nature, 361, 432–436.  
Walker, G. (1997). Current Developments in Catastrophe Modelling. In: N.R. Britton 
and J. Oliver (eds.), Financial Risks Management for Natural Catastrophes, 
Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia, 17–35.   
 
